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Political Participation Under Conditions of (Democratic) Duress 
 
Abstract  
Drawing on Amartya Sen’s concept of agency and capability, this paper explores political 
participation in three dimensions: individual dispositions, opportunities for and processes of 
participation. It presents an analytical approach that examines these dimensions in relation to 
practices of participation as interactions between the State and citizens within and outside of 
political institutions. Two examples are used to illustrate the utility of this approach in states 
where democratic institutions are deficient. The first example historically traces the evolution 
of tribal informal institutions in Jordan to demonstrate how and why they mediate people’s 
participation in the public sphere. The second example uses narrative inquiry to explore 
activists’ aspiration for and commitment to political expression through social media in 
Vietnam. Both examples suggest that a country’s political institutions and its rule of law may 
shape political cultures and societal values of participation, but it is the individuals’ 
recognition and response to these structures that ultimately shape their disposition to 
participation and create opportunities for them to participate. The paper emphasises 
understanding the contexts in which traditions of political participation take place to 
understand the outcomes as well as the conditions for participation, especially in contexts that 
theoretically qualify as authoritarian.  
Key words: Political participation, political agency, political regime, authoritarianism, civil 




In an age of globalisation, increasing inequality, emerging power of autocratic states and their 
rising economic dominance, the world has experienced a sharp escalation of new forms of 
political ideologies and representation reflecting variably on people’s political participation. 
While existing autocracies continue posing challenges to their citizens’ opportunities to enact 
political change, scholars have recently drawn attention to how democratic norms and 
institutions may be eroded from within seemingly democratic polities (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 




2019), creating new and more sophisticated forms of autocracy. Given these trends, it 
becomes even more crucial to study and understand political participation in contexts where 
democratic forms of governance may be under duress. In this paper, we propose a novel 
approach that draws attention to the specific circumstances in which people come to 
understand traditions of political participation and take choices to participate. We argue that it 
is important to understand the contexts of political participation because contexts create 
conditions for and eventually outcomes of participation, which may take numerous forms and 
may be disguised as individual or collective action aimed at bringing about political change, 
but not necessarily changing the political regime itself. A pluralistic approach towards 
political participation can help to appreciate the significance of such practices for people 
living under democratic duress, where formal channels of participation are often denied or 
incapable of adequately reflecting people’s preferences.  
 
A pluralistic approach to political participation 
As noted by Pippa Norris (2002), contemporary interpretations of political participation tend 
to understand the notion solely in terms of free and fair electoral voting, voting turnouts or 
citizens’ attitudes towards their political systems (Bennett and Robert, 2000). Such an 
approach is problematic because the aforementioned dimensions of political participation are 
underscored by values and institutional formations stemming primarily from “Western” 
political systems and their history of political experience. It would be erroneous to assume 
that these dimensions would operate in ways that suggest political agency anywhere. 
Diamond and Gunther (2002) have noted that globally, there has been a dramatic increase of 
elections, free or not, with an increasing number of states adopting seemingly democratic 
electoral institutions, yet this is not necessarily a sign of democratic triumph. Often, instead 
of providing credible checks on the power of the ruling elite or symbolising citizens’ political 
agency, the presence of elections may instead strengthen the existing regime (Geddes et al., 
2014; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007) amounting to “electoral” or “competitive autocracies” 
(Levitsky and Way, 2010), or various kinds of “hybrid regimes” where democratic and non-
democratic institutions coexist producing results favourable to political elites. 
Participation in various civil society organisations is likewise often interpreted as 
evidence of political participation. Union membership, community groups, voluntary or 
professional associations are commonly avenues for mobilising people’s political activism, 
yet the political influence of these institutions are significantly different across the globe. In 




within the system of state corporatism (Gohar, 2008; ILO Vietnam, 2018; Wrest, 2017) and 
function as the basis of state-sponsored and state-controlled political participation (Albrecht, 
2005). In fact, state-sponsored corporatism is often carried out to legitimise the existing 
regime by organising participation activities aligned with the State’s policies (Pham, 2019). 
Viewing civil society groups as somewhat autonomous from the state overlooks that the 
state-society relations are often intertwined and overlapping, and neglects the importance of 
conditions under which these relations may actually enable independent political 
participation. Furthermore, under conditions where formal civil society groups are closely 
observed by State authorities, participation in informal groups, such as friendships and family 
networks, are more important as forms of autonomous actions and may equally play a role in 
understanding politics (Pham, 2019). Accounting for plurality of political participation, as 
Huntington and Nelson (1976: 28) observed, “requires a consideration of the notion of 
authority because the attitude of political elites towards political participation is probably the 
single most decisive factor influencing the nature of participation in that society”. 
The internet is often saluted in contemporary politics as a force that enables political 
participation due to its potential to challenge and criticise those in power. Yet, there is little 
evidence to support the idea that the internet poses a credible threat to autocratic rule or 
enable political change (Kalathil and Boas, 2001). Indeed, social media can serve a dual 
function by not only enabling ordinary people to express opposition to the existing regimes 
(Heng, 2004), but also empowering political elites to strengthen dominant political ideologies 
and nationalist populism. Analysing the impact of the internet on political participation thus 
should account for contexts in which participation occurs to illuminate its actual 
beneficiaries. 
Theoretical insights from authoritarian governance present further reason to re-
examine contemporary approach to political participation. Autocrats are acknowledged to 
rule and maintain power through three primary “pillars of stability”, namely, repression, co-
optation and seeking legitimation – understood here in a non-normative way as a degree to 
which institutions are perceived as successful in the pursuit of collective interest 
(Gerschewski, 2013; Merkel et al., 2013). Authoritarian rulers must not necessarily be 
repressive, they can also rule and maintain power through institutions that are perceived as 
successful in delivering people desired outcomes or increase people’s procedural freedoms, 
resembling a rise in political participation, albeit under controlled circumstances. Given 




institutions in autocracies, as noted by Pepinsky (2014), cannot be analysed in isolation from 
incentives that motivate regime behaviour. 
A rapprochement between political science with anthropological and sociological 
perspectives offers a more convincing path towards studying political participation, going 
beyond the formal “rules of the game” to incorporate assessment of informal institutions that 
locates participation within the contexts of people’s social practices. Examining participation 
outside of formal or in informal institutions has broadened the understanding of political 
agency and participation in more cross-cultural, pluralistic and diverse societies dominated by 
a variety of traditions, beliefs and expectations directed toward political authority. For 
example, Mahmood’s (2001) hermeneutical approach towards analysing the activities of the 
women’s Islamic movement in Egypt has suggested that although individuals may operate 
under coercive conditions, they may still be equipped with political agency and capacity for 
action that their specific contexts create. Yurchak (2006) has located people’s constitutive 
agency in the Soviet Union, underlining that beliefs of Soviet impregnability stemmed from 
more than people’s blind obedience to the regime. Several studies that have focused on the 
role of informality in the political domain have been located particularly in Southeast Asia 
(SEA), where political and societal hierarchies are significantly dominated by Confucian 
ideals (Rodan, 2018; Ditmer and Fukui, 2000). According to Fukui (2000: 11), informal 
politics is much more than a deviation from the orthodox expression of formal politics – in 
fact, they underscore politics on all levels influencing significantly “who gets what, when, 
how and at whose expense”. Just as formal rules of the game are permeated by informal 
norms that determine “appropriate” behaviour and even political conduct, socially shared 
norms, even without being legally codified, may exert equally strong influence on people’s 
understanding, exercise and outcomes of political participation. Rodan (2018) has recently 
underlined this point, arguing that regime dynamics in multiple SEA states can be better 
understood through a focus on ways in which political conflict is structured, maintained and 
organised, beyond the formally institutional avenues for participation. 
The importance of informality in political participation and indeed, formal politics 
itself is by no means limited to autocracies alone. Scholars have located participation in 
supposedly apolitical and informal institutions even in countries with a long-standing 
democratic tradition. Verba et al. (1995) underlined the role of various voluntary religious 
and community organisations in America, in equipping individuals with knowledge, skills 
and resources for political participation, as well as mobilising individuals for political action. 




part of people’s participation. Their importance may be exacerbated by the inadequacy of 
democratic political institutions, but their presence is not contained in authoritarian settings 
alone. Extending the conceptual scope of political participation to encompass informal 
networks beyond the directly “political” may help to better understand political agency not 
only in countries where democratic institutions are under duress, but also come to appreciate 
people’s practices of participation as a multifaceted phenomenon done within and distanced 
from political institutions, and the myriad of innovative and creative ways in which people 
exercise their political agency and rationalise their circumstances, beliefs and even 
opportunities for inflicting political change. 
Along these sentiments underlined by the aforementioned authors, this paper explores 
how political participation is embedded within the relations between the state and its citizens, 
how participation shapes and is shaped by formal and informal institutional structures and 
how citizens respond to these structures and relations. We are interested in who participates, 
how, where and why they participate, and the ways in which they participate in the public 
sphere. We use two country examples of Jordan and Vietnam, typically classified as 
autocracies, to put forward a case for understanding political participation contextually rather 
than assume that people are robbed of their political agency because of inadequate 
democratic institutions and illustrate how political participation can simultaneously be a 
mechanism for and result of political contestation. The first example historically traces the 
evolution of tribal informal institutions to demonstrate how and why they mediate people’s 
participation in the public sphere. The second example uses narrative inquiry to explore 
activists’ experience of political expression through social media in Vietnam. Both examples 
suggest that a country’s political institutions may shape political cultures and societal values 
of participation, but it is the individual recognition of and response to these structures that 
ultimately create people’s motivations and opportunities to participate. They illuminate how 
various forms of organisations, even if they operate in informal ways, shape people’s 
perceptions about what is “political”, create conditions for participation within and outside 
the formally codified set of institutions that officially determine who rules or can engage in 
politics.  
 
Analytical dimensions of political participation and agency   
Rather than generalising from comparative politics, or applying theories or experiences 
drawn from mature democracies to other political systems, we want to explore political 




participation, their opportunities to enter the public sphere and the processes in which they 
undertake arrangements in that public sphere to bring about political change. We draw on 
Amartya Sen’s (1985, 1999) concept of agency and capability to propose a novel approach to 
analyse these dimensions. Sen’s notion of agency includes one’s pursuit of their individual 
values and objectives, regardless of any external criteria that such pursuit be evaluated 
against. In this way, an “agent” is someone who “acts and brings about change” directly or 
indirectly through political, economic or social actions in accordance to their individual 
beliefs, values and aspirations (Sen, 1999: 19). For Sen, capability encompasses the 
substantive opportunities (or freedom) to do and be what a person values doing and being. 
Sen also acknowledged that social, economic and political conditions impact a person’s 
values set; thus, must be accounted for and considered relative to their freedom and agency in 
any thoughts or analysis of policy-objectives and processes through which social justice is 
furthered in any polity (Sen, 1985).  
We apply Sen’s thinking to shift the focus from directly identifiable political 
institutions such as political parties, elections, or the media to political agents (individuals or 
groups) and any mediums that they use to engage in the public sphere. In this paper, 
institutions are understood as formal and informal constraints that shape human interaction, 
which may be officially codified through formal channels (such as parliaments, laws or 
elections) or sanctioned through prevalent social norms, informally guiding people’s 
behaviour. Following Sen, we assume that people partake in the polity through whatever 
avenues and structures available to them for the pursuit of their goals; their values and goals 
are shaped by and within these structures and relations, which can also be altered as a 
consequence of their participation. We employ Habermas’ (1989) concept of “public sphere" 
– a virtual or imaginary community which does not necessarily exist in any identifiable space 
– to refer to the venues in which political participation may be observed. In this way, the 
public sphere extends beyond formal “rules of the game” – electoral or otherwise – involving 
also the communal space, which may be only inadvertently “political”. Consequently, 
political participation is understood in this paper as people’s dispositions, opportunities and 
processes through which people pursue their reasoned political values and aspirations, 
influencing the state. We now define these three dimensions and how they will be applied in 
the two examples of Jordan and Vietnam.  
The first dimension - disposition - is defined as a sensibility about politics and 
political participation, which is acquired through a person’s lifetime of experiences and 




participation; in other words what people consider to be “political”, and whether they have 
reason to value engaging in politics and participation. Factors that shape disposition include 
structural components like political rights, civil liberties, freedom of expression, mode of 
communication in the public sphere (for example, social media), and civil society 
organisations or informal networks of families and friends. Disposition towards political 
participation also signifies people’s shared understanding with the State and other citizens 
about these structures which may then motivate or hinder their political participation. Our 
examples will focus on people’s values and motivations that guide their choice to participate 
in the polity, and the factors that shape these values and motivations. 
The second dimension – opportunities – refers to perceived as well as actual 
opportunities to engage in political participation because people’s perceptions may equally 
influence their decision to take up political participation or deter them from doing so. 
Distinguishing between perceived and actual opportunities is of crucial importance if we 
wish to examine not only the permissibility of a political act, but also how an appearance of 
these opportunities affects people’s motivations and intentions to exercise their freedoms 
(Sen, 1999). There are numerous instances where the institutional structures for political 
participation are in place, but the freedom to participate they imply is either not realised in 
practice or is curtailed by people’s perceptions of how effective these structures are in 
bringing about change. These perceptions, in turn, influence their choice to participate. It is 
important to pay attention to the opportunities for political participation in specific contexts 
and situations; particularly the relationships that people have with their political systems and 
the State. At the same time, these relationships cultivate a certain political culture and ethos 
that could either deter people from speaking out against the authorities and political elites or 
enable them to do so. For many actors it may be a “rational” choice to cooperate rather than 
oppose the regime in trying to pursue their desired ends – such cooperation may be 
incentivised by formal rules that prohibit dissent, or others that offer advantages in exchange 
for compliance, even prompting collective forms of self-censorship. Political structures and 
participation work interdependently and do not always follow the same causal direction. Our 
examples will analyse 1) how societal  structures (including but not limited to formal 
institutions) and political relations (between the state and society, and among citizens) play a 
role in creating actual opportunities to apply oneself politically; and 2) how norms and beliefs 
(at a societal or individual level) may influence political agents’ perceptions of opportunities 




 The third dimension - processes - refers to the mechanisms or procedures in which 
people engage in political participation. It is underpinned by Sen’s idea of “process aspect of 
agency” that centres on a person’s power, which Sen defines as a person’s ability to choose to 
take up an action in order to achieve an outcome (Sen, 1985). To understand the processes of 
participation, we have to understand the person’s power position within various political 
structures and State-society relations. This dimension attends to the ways in which State 
officials and institutions make and implement policies, rules and regulations and the ways in 
which political actors respond to such policies, rules and regulations. We are interested in 
whether the processes of participation legitimise these rules of the game thereby keeping the 
government in power, or whether the people have the power to deliberate their own voices 
and activities to keep the government accountable in autonomous ways. Our analyses will 
focus on the mechanisms, avenues and activities which political actors choose to take up to 
deliberate their political values and voice in light of their power position within the public 
sphere; and the consequences of these processes for future participation.  
 These three dimensions operate in interdependent ways together framing the 
conditions, avenues and outcomes of political participation. People’s opportunities for 
political participation are guided by the processes enabled by institutional structures and 
power relations between the State and society. Such processes determine the space within 
which people are expected to deliberate their values and goals, influencing also their 
perceptions about whether, why, and how to engage in the public sphere. People’s response 
to these structures and their experiences of political participation, in turn, foster their 
dispositions to pursue political actions and carry expectations for future participation. In other 
words, political participation is an expression of people’s values and (advertently or 
inadvertently political) aspirations; while at the same time, it is also a formative experience 
that shapes values and aspirations for participation. Understanding the interdependent 
workings of these three dimensions opens space for a wider and more context-dependent 
analysis of political participation – one not limited to certain procedures and mechanisms 
(like elections) but extended to cultural and informal networks which may equally present 
opportunities or pose obstacles to political participation.  
In explicating these concepts through our examples, we argue that people’s 
interactions with the surrounding political structures and relations can enable, create and 
explain political participation. These interactions portray a dialectic relationship between 
political agents and environments in which people exercise political agency. These 




three dimensions of disposition, opportunities and processes carry important implications for 
understanding political participation, but also acknowledge that this analytical approach may 
not be a great fit everywhere, especially when scholars seek to compare participation 
globally. The relevance of the approach is thus limited not as much by types of governance, 
as by scholars’ ontological and epistemological positions guiding their methodological 
approach and the aims of their research. 
 
Tribally mediated participation in Jordan 
This example illustrates, from a historical perspective, how people’s opportunities to 
participate, their dispositions towards political participation, and their choice of processes 
through which to express political agency in the Jordanian public sphere is heavily influenced 
by informal institutions rooted in tribal values. Family, tribal and kin networks are justifiably 
recognised as pervasive forces in Jordanian society, which permeate people’s social relations. 
On a governmental level, Bedouin and tribal values are asserted as the main pillars of 
Jordan’s cultural heritage and tribal membership informs people’s voting patterns (Lust-Okar, 
2009). On a societal level, unparalleled importance is still attached to wasta, which as an 
informal institution associated with tribal life, is typically referred to as “having 
connections”, “favouritism” (Harmsen, 2008), or exchanging beneficial treatment based on 
pre-existing social capital (El-Said and Harrigan, 2009). Underlining the importance and even 
necessity of maintaining good relations with one’s family, kin or tribe, wasta serves as a 
crucial social currency exchanged for accessing multiple advantages to lead a life in the 
Hashemite Kingdom.  
Formal institutions in Jordan have not been exclusive determinants of “who gets what, 
when and how”, to borrow Harold Lasswell’s (1936) definition of politics. Instead, the actual 
responsibility of distributing access to opportunities has come to be legitimately located also 
within social structures, which at times enable people’s access to socio-economic and 
political freedoms or hinder them by creating collectively justified practices for 
discrimination (Kaleja, 2019). Rather than asserting such structures as innate cultural 
attributes of Jordanian society, this example draws primarily on secondary sources to situate 
the role of tribal values within a historical context, tied also to the monarchy’s strategies for 
legitimising its rule. The example traces the evolution of political power acquired through 
group membership, so although it perceivably influences individual behaviour, people’s 




demonstrates why and how informal norms of behaviour have come to mediate people’s 
shared beliefs about the relations between the state and the society, attitudes towards politics 
and views about permissible and “appropriate” participation.  
Respect for one’s family and kin throughout different periods has been fostered from 
above as a valued and even necessary social structure imperative for one’s survival. The 
monarchy’s interest in empowering tribal relations rests primarily in its approach to 
ideologically legitimise the Hashemite rule, the grounds for which were laid even prior to the 
country’s independence in 1946. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Abdullah of 
the Hashemite family was designated by the British as the desired leader of territories 
encompassing the Emirate of Transjordan (Ryan, 2002; Wilson, 1987). Given that Abdullah 
(who would later become king) was not himself of Transjordanian origin, nor shared a 
Bedouin ancestry with the majority of the population, he opted to legitimise the rule by 
emphasising his religious authority granted by the Hashemites’ genealogical lineage to the 
prophet Muhammad and hence distinguished the locally powerful Bedouin tribes as strategic 
allies to the regime. Alongside material advantages tactically distributed by Abdullah to 
tribes in exchange for compliance (Wilson, 1987: 72), tribal representatives were also granted 
access to wasta through administrative positions in the emerging state structures, bureaucracy 
and the government (El-Said and Harrigan, 2009). Therefore, in contrast to many other 
emerging states in the region, tribes were given a stake in the process of state-formation and 
established as the primary frameworks “for channelling and allocating resources and services 
originating from the central government” (Alon, 2006: 79). Tribesmen in these privileged 
positions served as the arbitrators between the state and the society, competing for and 
distributing resources acquired from the state to others in their respective tribal allegiances 
(Lust-Okar, 2006, 2009). Thus, a peculiar approach to socio-political life and participation 
was introduced, which remained tribally mediated, making one’s good standing with their 
family, tribal and kin networks imperative and even necessary for one’s survival. Due to this 
arrangement, the state was never separated from the tribes or religion, sanctioning informal 
institutions associated with tribal customs to play a part in how individual and collective 
problems were perceived or what responses were considered appropriate to solve them even 
after electoral institutions were introduced.  
Through different periods of Jordanian history, the partnership between the regime 
and the tribal population has been reinforced by different monarchs in power, considerably 
affecting the processes for people to express themselves politically. Elected parliamentarians 




candidates would primarily be motivated by gaining potential access to state resources or 
wasta and improving their social standing among the community (Lust-Okar, 2006). The 
society, consequently, came to view elected representatives above all as service-providers, 
able to deliver benefits due to their shared membership in tribal networks and therefore relied 
on informal processes to ensure their needs and opportunities rather than entrusting the 
responsibility with the state.  
Shortly after acquiring independence, the importance of participation through formal 
channels was further undermined by decades of martial law whereby political parties were 
banned in 1957 and elections seized to take place in 1967. Although electoral processes were 
not reintroduced until 1989, martial law did not annihilate people’s opportunities to 
participate in the public sphere. Formal channels for participation were admittedly limited, 
but collective forms of participation under the guise of associational life emerged as means to 
protect people’s interests and gain access to opportunities. Due to their perceived potential to 
challenge the rule and its legitimising narrative, civil society organisations were subject to 
state coercion exercised through strict bureaucratic regulation (Wiktorowicz, 2000). But 
subscribing to surrender their explicitly “political” aspirations to oppose state sovereignty or 
the monarchy, the civil society nevertheless retained opportunities to channel “apolitical” 
demands to decision-makers and improve their individual well-being through membership in 
collective associations. Labour unions and professional associations advocated for their 
members’ interests through negotiating the terms for the protection of their economic and 
social interests with the state, and independently introducing various welfare services 
extended to their members (Larzilliere, 2012: 16). The number of voluntary and charitable 
organisations likewise grew under martial law (Harmsen, 2008: 151), legitimising inter-
communal networks of support and mutual assistance as means to deal with socio-economic 
hardship. Rooted in ideas of tribal reciprocity and Islamic duty to help those in need (El-Said 
and Harrigan, 2009: 1238) such exhibitions of social solidarity only strengthened the 
importance of tribal relations and wasta in Jordanian public sphere. 
Meanwhile, the revitalisation of associational life paradoxically consolidated the 
legitimacy of the monarchy even in the absence of electoral institutions, as it too remained 
justified through a religious and tribal narrative. The regime supported strengthening tribal 
loyalties by emphasising tribal values as the central tenant for nation-building, articulating 
the palace’s view that “whatever harms our tribes is considered harmful to us, and this has 
been the case all along, and it will continue to be so forever” (King Hussein quoted in Jordan 




the public sphere and endorsed people’s dispositions towards attaining their political 
objectives through participation in collective avenues strengthening the need to nurture tribal 
affiliations.  
Taking into consideration that for decades people’s actual opportunities to ensure 
their needs depended on membership in communal, tribal and family networks, their 
perceived notions about the “appropriate” channels to deal with problems typically entrusted 
to the state were also affected. Therefore, after martial law was lifted and electoral channels 
for participation made available in the 1990s, informal networks often took precedence over 
elections as people’s voluntarily chosen processes for solving their issues. This choice was, 
first, strengthened by the fact that the introduction of democratic institutions coincided with 
economic liberalisation and recession, characterised by a sharp decline in people’s living 
standards. With an increasing number of people facing a dire need for socio-economic 
support, the supposedly “apolitical” welfare function continued to be entrusted to the society, 
reviving horizontal channels for distribution as mediated by family, tribal and kin affiliations.  
Second, as the primary value for kin-based organisations has been to pool communal 
resources for redistribution, the tribal institution has itself adapted significantly expanding 
criteria for membership to accommodate people with wider variety of loyalties than that of 
the immediate tribe. Baylouny (2006) notes how informal groups increasingly invented their 
associational identities tracing lineage back to a common ancestor, place of origin or even 
across several centuries in order to attract non-relatives. Potential beneficiaries were, in turn, 
urged to “adapt their practices” (Bouziane, 2010: 41) and align their values with the 
respective groups in order to ensure access to these otherwise unavailable resources. Such 
flexibility of the tribal institution has endorsed people’s preference of extra-institutional 
processes for participation. 
Third, even under electoral “rules of the game”, the monarchy continued showing 
support for constituents embracing their tribal identities by strengthening the representation 
of tribes in the parliament (Lust-Okar, 2009). Electoral rules have been altered four times 
since 1989 so as to appease the monarchy’s tribal support-base (Muasher, 2011) and 
incentivise people’s voting behaviour towards casting ballots for tribal candidates as opposed 
to those from political parties. King Abdullah II who succeeded to the throne in 1999 has 
likewise reiterated the mutual reliance between the tribes and the Palace, proposing 
amendments in the constitution to recognise family as the “foundation of the Society” built 
on religion, morals and patriotism, and ascribing the law to strengthen this “legal entity”. 




representative of the entire people, exercising legislative authority and able to hold the 
government accountable, is far from citizens’ minds”. As people’s dispositions to participate 
in elections is informed by their expectation of receiving wasta and services from those they 
have helped elect, the candidates’ allegiance is likewise shaped by these reciprocal 
obligations.  
In brief, this example illustrates the interdependence of opportunity, process and 
dispositional dimensions for shaping people’s participation in the polity. Kin and tribal 
networks have established themselves as effective channels for solving individual and 
collective problems in Jordan, so although people’s actual opportunities to participate in the 
public sphere have admittedly expanded over the period of democratisation, the perceived 
power to successfully enact change remains located primarily within these informal social 
structures. People’s sensibility about “political” agency notably excludes outright conflict 
with the monarchy, but there remain a multitude of supposedly “apolitical” functions still 
exercised by the society by applying their agency through informal networks (Lust-Okar and 
Zerhouni, 2008). As distributing access to opportunities and providing mechanisms for 
people to meet their needs remains legitimately located within social structures, it is 
understandable how people are disposed to value participation in and through these structures 
and endorse practices that socialise individuals into doings and beings embedded within 
them. With little incentive to express participation outside of tribal and kin networks 
(Baylouny, 2006), these informal institutions have become people’s preferred processes for 
engaging in the public sphere, attaining one’s needs, ensuring access to opportunities and 
influencing their motivations for participating.  
 
Political activism through social media in Vietnam  
In 1986, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) approved Doi Moi (Renovation) reform, 
allowing Vietnam to operate a market-based economy. To accord with this policy shift from 
the centrally planned economic model, circulation of information was relaxed in Vietnam. 
The Party actively encouraged openness by allowing editors and reporters to be less timid to 
exposing nepotism, corruption and bureaucracy (Marr, 1993). There has been a significant 
increase of books published since 1986. Censorship and other media controls in radio, 
television and films were also relaxed. With the growth of the internet and social media in the 
21st century that coincided with Vietnam’s entering the global economy and declaring its 
openness to the world, online discussions in Vietnam flourished. Some scholars have said 




2004), while others, particularly people inside the country, have claimed that social media 
platforms are venues for open exchange by government officials and Party members to 
promote themselves or attacking counterparts. At the same time, a glance of Vietnamese 
social media presents numerous examples of citizen groups set up to discuss policy issues.  
The example illustrated here is based on a project that investigated community 
activism in Vietnam. Using ethnographic narrative inquiry methodology, the first author 
shadowed three community activists for a period of six months. The following is an account 
of observations of their activities mainly blogging on Facebook, analysis of their blogs and 
in-depth interviews. Given the scope of the paper, the account presents a summative 
overview of the participants’ reflection on their “political” self, which departs from the 
presentation of narratives through quotes typical of narrative inquiry (Riessman, 2008).  
All three activists were in their mid-30s, living and working in Hanoi, the capital city 
of Vietnam. Two were professionals working for foreign-owned companies and one was an 
academic currently teaching at a public university. All three had obtained postgraduate 
qualifications overseas and undergraduate degrees in Vietnam and have returned to Vietnam 
for about 3-5 years. Quan, the academic, came from a family of the Revolution - political 
elite family with generations of Party membership. Both he and his wife were loyal Party 
members. Prior to going overseas, Quan had wanted to pursue a political career in Vietnam 
with the aim of upholding socialist ideals, an aspiration which he attributed to his 
grandparents’ and parents’ aspirations. He joined Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union in 
eighth grade, where the norm in Vietnam is ninth grade for a dedicated Party idealist. The 
other two had no affiliation with the Party.  
Quan felt that his sojourn in Germany changed his political views significantly. 
Although his disposition to participate was shaped by his Revolutionary background, which 
motivated him to voice his opinion publicly, his goals had changed from ascendance in the 
CPV to political contestation. In reflecting on this new “political” desire, he spoke about 
Vietnam’s political system and its injustices. He realised that making change to bring about 
social justice would be impossible if he continued to be conservative with his thoughts about 
Vietnam’s political thoughts. Quan’s view echoed Minh and Lam (the other two activists) 
who also spoke about Vietnam’s history being framed by the State for its own objectives. As 
a collective, they were cognisant of the idea that the State portrays itself as the “right” regime 
because the State is protecting it. As Lam remarked about his time overseas; “Sometimes, we 
are blind to the regime because we are living within that regime. When I stepped out of the 




normalised within specific conditions, which if recognised, could allow them to understand 
their positionalities within that set of codified rules and beliefs.  
These activists have always had strong aspirations for political participation and 
viewed political expression in the public sphere to be a way to advocate for social change. 
Speaking out on a public domain had an intrinsic value for them which instituted their 
disposition to political expression. For Quan, such disposition was attributable to his 
Revolutionary background. For others, it was related to self-actualisation where suppression 
of voice was a marginalisation of their agency and autonomy.  
All three used Facebook blogging as an avenue to deliberate their political voice and 
be heard. They saw the opportunity for stimulating a public debate about the CPV’s political 
ideologies, and that they could influence other Facebook group members towards a potential 
movement. Quan started off by writing about his observations of Germany’s political 
systems, their right-wing and left-wing party movements and outlooks, social welfare policies 
and their contentions, and their market-based economies, which he felt were more equitable 
and thus more Marxist-oriented than in Vietnam. A fervent discussion on the subject took 
place by his friends, members of the Facebook group and other followers. A thread of 
conversation between Quan and some members of the groups was observed, which revealed 
the members’ negative responses and hostility toward Quan’s expression. Quan’s account of 
these responses was that they were not based on ideology, rather, they were dependent on the 
person’s social position in society, which was intimately connected with their relationships 
with State officials. Similarly, Minh pointed out that in the public forum, many people agreed 
about the State’s socialist ideologies and their misdirection in policies and practices. The 
people who disagreed with him also acknowledged that the problems he pointed to exist, but 
they objected to his call for change because they wanted to protect their benefits, their vested 
interests, and ultimately their pursuit of a political class. These activists spoke loudly about 
the culture of harmony by maintaining the status quo – the silent culture. 
These activists spoke about the sense of alienation from their group, many of whom 
were their friends. Their sense of social disconnection stemmed from the perception that their 
expressions were inappropriate in the immediate political contexts. Rejection of their ideas 
were not because of the content itself, rather the space in which the content was placed. 
although they felt that there was a shared understanding of the issue at hand, which allowed 
them the opportunity to deliberate their voice, the process of deliberation in this particular 
public forum did not enable their ideas to be effectively mobilised. While they all engaged in 




disposition stemmed from his political background as much as his acquired learning in 
Germany; others’ dispositions were shaped by their perception of the freedom to speak. All 
three felt their expressions were conditioned on the appropriateness of what they spoke, and 
“appropriateness” was determined by political ambitions of those around them. In this regard, 
the opportunity for political participation was intimately tied to the contexts that shape each 
person’s conception of political freedom or opportunity, and processes of participation; both 
were dependent on the individual’s political position in society and their relationships with 
each other. 
This example suggests that members of a collective group can have different 
dispositions for political participation. These activists were inclined to take up political 
participation because of their held values. They saw and grasped the opportunity to 
participate in an advertently “political” way. However, other members of the group were 
motivated by individual political interests, which in the context of Vietnam meant accordance 
with the State ideologies, which paradoxically led to “non-political” actions. This example 
suggests that the choice, action and outcome of the activists’ political participation was 
dependent on their perceived opportunity, which were shaped by their power position in 
relation to the Party and each other, and within the broader political structure. The State’s 
strict rules about opposing the Party’s ideologies (Hannah, 2007; Nguyen, 2008) preclude any 
conception of opportunity or that the opportunity is not perceived to be available equally to 
the people; the latter is suggested through these activists’ experiences.  
With regards to the processes of participation, the activists’ encounter of opposition in 
social media suggests an asymmetry in political expressions due to different political views. 
The Vietnamese communication culture fosters a different understanding about what is 
permissible “talk” in the public sphere. Vietnamese people carry out their roles in accordance 
with the hierarchies of personal relations which is passed into the public sphere (Pham, 
2019). Confucius-oriented behaviours foster “speaking” in line with one’s role. The State-
society relations eschew the Confucius rule where citizens and government officials do not 
occupy the same communication privileges, nor are such communication exchanges mutually 
respected. Communication tends to be one way from the authoritative (government) to 
subordinates (citizens), or from senior/older leaders to junior/younger subordinates. 
Compounded with the forbidden hostile expressions against the State, the communication 
mechanisms employed by Facebook groups reflected the embodied culture of seeing the State 
as an authority and with that were constructed boundaries of “permissible expression” about 




communication between government officials and citizens (Wischermman, 2005), which the 
activists referred to as a systemic practice of “silent culture”. The silent culture was 
manifested not only by the existing communication culture, levels of connections with elites, 
rules and regulations imposed by the State, but also because of people’s preservation of own 
interests as they responded to these structures and relations.  
In summary, this example suggests that understanding citizens’ disposition to political 
participation is an important consideration in understanding the opportunity dimension of 
participation. Those with the disposition to participate did so as long as they perceived 
opportunity to be available to them, that is disposition alone was not enough. The 
opportunities that these activists perceived and the processes in which they engaged were 
conditioned by the norms of communication in the polity, their power relations with other 
members in the Facebook group, their membership with the Party. Those who thought 
participation would improve their power position chose to participate and those who did not 
chose not to. Each activist had a different experience of open dialogues resulted from 
different understandings about what they could and could not do, which in turn, instituted 
varied dispositions to political participation. Although the outcomes were not achieved in the 
ways they wanted, these activists felt that their choice and actions were more important than 
the outcomes because the action resulted from their “reasoned values” about the worth of 
participation, and that they were agents who could bring about change. This suggests that 
participation has an intrinsic value for the person’s agency not only instrumental value in 
achieving political change. 
Conclusion 
The insights from these examples demonstrate the benefits of contextual analysis of political 
participation at the collective level (Jordan) and individual level (Vietnam). Both examples 
point to the possibilities for political agency even under conditions of democratic duress and 
suggest the importance of understanding varied modes of political participation, the avenues 
and venues in which they take place and whether they offer prospects for democratic 
practices or reinforcement of current or past regimes. Individual and collective participation 
in the public sphere is of value not only if it disrupts the status quo, but also when it 
perpetuates it. Such acts may not comprise rebellion or dissent, but they are nevertheless 
exhibitions of people’s agency. 
 These examples illustrate the usefulness of an analysis that centres on people’s 




processes which they choose to participate through. The analyses suggest that participation 
comprises continuous societal efforts as well as pressures from the authorities, who may be 
inclined to delineate and limit people’s participation through one or more of these 
dimensions. Understandably, political participation contextualised broadly will have 
individual, collective and eventually also national-level variations, many of which may defy 
empirical generalisation, but all of which will be crucial in understanding the ways in which 
people influence the political developments in the state, whether or not serving as political 
agents has been their intent. 
 Our approach, with emphasis on normative agency and the interactions between the 
State and citizens rather than the procedural aspects of participation, is more adaptable to 
research that orients towards pluralistic values and exploratory research objectives. At a 
broader level, this approach offers several advantages. First, it underlines that participation in 
the public sphere is contextual – delineated by the “rules of the game” in the respective polity 
and shaped by accumulated power relations between the state and society. In this way, 
participation too is shaped by historical, regional and cultural contingencies, resulting from 
the continuous interactive process of negotiating collective values and adapting individual 
goals respectively. Second, it shows that there is plenty of space for political agency even 
outside the scope of opposition and dissent. By fusing the understanding of these concepts, it 
is possible to miss myriad ways in which individuals may seek to bring about a socially just 
polity, even under delineated bounds of permissible activity. This is of particular value when 
examining political participation in conditions under democratic duress because, as the 
examples provided in this paper have illustrated, political participation is better understood 
through the processes that shape it rather than its immediate result. It is a continuous societal 
effort intertwined with individual and collective values, power-relations, which influence 
how they seek to exercise their agency, what channels they use to do this and what their aims 
are in doing so in the first place. This conceptual proposition is the paper’s contribution to the 
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